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We take a game-theoretic approach to the analysis of juries by
modelling voting as a game of incomplete information. Rather than
the usual assumption of two possible signals (one indicating guilt, the
other innocence), we allow jurors to perceive a full spectrum of signals.
Given any voting rule requiring a ﬁxed fraction of votes to convict, we
characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the game, and we
consider the possibility of asymmetric equilibria: we give a condition
under which no asymmetric equilibria exist and show that, without
it, asymmetric equilibria may exist. We oﬀer a condition under which
unanimity rule exhibits a bias toward convicting the innocent, regard-
less of the size of the jury, and we exhibit an example showing this
bias can be reversed. And we prove a “jury theorem” for our general
model: as the size of the jury increases, the probability of a mistaken
judgment goes to zero for every voting rule, except unanimity rule;
for unanimity rule, we give a condition under which the probability of
a mistake is bounded strictly above zero, and we show that, without
this condition, the probability of a mistake may go to zero.1 Introduction
Consider a group of decision-makers who must choose one of two alterna-
tives. Voters agree on the overall objective, but, on the basis of diﬀerential
information, they may disagree on which alternative best achieves that goal.
Some examples are:
• A jury deciding whether to convict or acquit a defendant. Jurors agree
about the desirability of acquitting an innocent and convicting a guilty
defendant, but they have diﬀerent opinions about whether the defen-
dant is innocent or guilty.
• The board of directors of a company deciding whether to approve a
new investment project. All members of the board agree on the desir-
ability of higher proﬁts, but they disagree about whether the project
is proﬁtable.
• A group of medical experts deciding on a treatment for a patient. The
common objective is the patient’s health, but there is disagreement
about the best procedure for the patient.
Though such examples are necessarily special, in that they presume a com-
mon objective shared among the decision-makers, they have provided a use-
ful benchmark for the investigation of information aggregation in collective
decision-making.
We follow an old literature on information aggregation in elections by fo-
cusing on the jury example. The literature traces back to Condorcet’s (1785)
jury theorem, which asserts that, under majority voting, large electorates
should reach correct decisions with very high probability (cf. Miller (1986),
Grofman and Feld (1988), Young (1988), Ladha (1992), Berg (1993)). It is
traditionally assumed that each voter simply behaves “naively,” as if deciding
the outcome alone, but Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) observed that, given
naive behavior on the part of jurors, some may have an incentive to vote
“strategically.” In other words, naive behavior does not generally constitute
an equilibrium. The issue of strategic voting under incomplete information
was also taken up by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997). We follow
subsequent papers in analyzing voting in juries as a Bayesian game in which
1the jurors’ opinions of guilt or innocence, i.e., their “signals,” are private
information.
Several versions of the jury theorem under strategic voting have been of-
fered. Myerson (1998) introduces uncertainty about the size of the electorate
and considers a countable set of players’ types (signals), where the number
of voters receiving any given signal is drawn from a Poisson distribution, the
mean of which depends on guilt or innocence. He proves the existence of a
sequence of equilibria that generate the results of Condorcet’s jury theorem
as the expected number of jurors goes to inﬁnity. Wit (1998) shows that,
in the Austen-Smith and Banks model, the non-trivial equilibria of the vot-
ing game corroborate Condorcet’s jury theorem. More generally, McClennan
(1998) proves that, given any voting rule, there is at least one equilibrium
that maximizes the ex ante payoﬀs of jurors over the class of all symmetric
strategy proﬁles. Since naive voting is a symmetric strategy proﬁle, each ju-
ror’s payoﬀ from that optimal equilibrium strategy proﬁle is at least equal to
the payoﬀ from voting naively. As a consequence, if Condorcet’s jury theorem
holds under naive voting, then it will also hold in the optimal equilibrium. If
there are no other equilibria, then, of course, the jury theorem is completely
robust to the strategic incentives of the jurors.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) analyze a model in which there are
two possible signals, one indicating guilt and the other innocence. Given any
voting rule requiring a ﬁxed fraction of votes to convict, they are able to
explicitly solve for the unique symmetric, responsive Bayesian equilibrium of
the voting game. They show that a jury theorem holds for all voting rules
other than unanimity: as the size of the jury increases, the probability of a
mistaken judgment goes to zero for all voting rules except unanimity; in that
case, the probability of a mistake is bounded strictly above zero. Fedder-
sen and Pesendorfer (1998) also give an example comparing diﬀerent voting
rules for a ﬁxed jury size: there, the probability of convicting an innocent
defendant under unanimity rule is greater than the probability under ma-
jority or any other supermajority rule. McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) oﬀer
experimental results on the “binary signal” model roughly consistent with
the equilibrium predictions.
We depart from the previous literature on juries by assuming that the
signals representing the jurors’ opinions of guilt or innocence are drawn
2from continuous, rather than discrete (usually binary), distributions. This
is meant to capture the fact that a juror’s opinion of the evidence against
the defendant, the case made by the prosecutor, etc., may reﬂect a very
rich spectrum of possibilities — possibilities that cannot be summarized by
a dichotomous signal merely indicating guilt or innocence. We impose very
few restrictions on the distributions of signals, and we obtain a continuous
analogue of the binary signal model as a special case. Unlike Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1997), we conﬁne our attention to the case in which the
objectives of the jurors are perfectly aligned. Within this framework, we
investigate the issues of equilibrium existence and uniqueness, the general-
ization of Feddersen and Pesendorfer’s (1998) jury theorem, as well as the
extension of their results on the inferiority of unanimity rule.
We oﬀer three sets of results. First, we establish the existence of a sym-
metric, responsive equilibrium characterized by a cutoﬀ signal: jurors who
get signals indicating a higher likelihood of guilt vote for convicting the de-
fendant while those who get signals indicating a lower likelihood vote for
acquittal. The equilibrium is unique within that class. Moreover, under a
strict monotone likelihood ratio condition, all equilibria are cutoﬀ equilibria;
as a consequence, our uniqueness result extends to the class of all symmet-
ric, responsive strategy proﬁles, even allowing for mixed strategies. With
McClennan’s (1998) result, this implies that the equilibrium is optimal: it
maximizes the jurors’ ex ante payoﬀs over the set of symmetric strategy pro-
ﬁles. An undesirable artifact of the binary signal model of Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1998), and of the continuous version we consider, is that the
typical juror who votes to acquit must use mixed strategies and is, therefore,
indiﬀerent between voting to acquit or convict. When continuous distribu-
tions are allowed for, that need no longer be the case. Indeed, under the strict
monotone likelihood ratio condition, all equilibria are essentially strict: only
a juror who receives the cutoﬀ signal (a zero probability event) is indiﬀerent
to which vote he casts.
Second, we turn our attention to unanimity rule and give a suﬃcient con-
dition for the symmetric, responsive cutoﬀ equilibrium to be unique within
the class of all (possibly asymmetric) responsive strategy proﬁles. We then
give a suﬃcient condition for unanimity rule to exhibit a bias toward con-
victing the innocent, independently of the size of the jury. This condition
3is met in our continuous version of the binary signal model, with the fol-
lowing implication: unanimity rule leads to a higher probability a convicted
defendant is innocent than does majority or any other supermajority rule.
Thus, we ﬁnd that Feddersen and Pesendorfer’s (1998) ﬁxed jury size example
generalizes within the binary signal model. However, it does not generalize
completely: we provide an example of a continuous signal model in which
unanimity rule performs better than simple majority rule. We then we turn
to the asymptotic behavior of unanimity rule and ﬁnd, in contrast to Fed-
dersen and Pesendorfer (1988), that our conclusions depend on the structure
of information in the model: the probability of making a mistake is bounded
strictly above zero if the likelihood of innocence is bounded over the interval
of possible signals; otherwise, as illustrated by an example, it is possible that
the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero as the size of the jury
increases.
Third, we obtain a jury theorem for the general continuous signal model:
for all voting rules other than unanimity, the probability of a mistaken judg-
ment goes to zero as the size of the jury increases. The asymptotic eﬃciency
of all non-unanimous voting rules is fully general, and not merely an artifact
of the binary signal model. Under stronger informational assumptions than
those of our model, but still assuming continuous signals, Meirowitz (1999)
establishes existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibria and also proves
a jury theorem for non-unanimous voting rules. As he notes, an implication
is that large juries perform better than single jurors under strategic voting,
a result obtained by Condorcet (1985) under naive voting.
We leave many important issues untouched. One is the extension of
our results to situations in which the jurors’ preferences are not perfectly
aligned, a necessary step in order to use the continuous signal model in
other voting contexts. Under slightly stronger informational assumptions
than ours, Li, Rosen, and Suen (1999) take up this issue in a continuous
signal model with two jurors. Some other issues are: correlation among the
jurors’ signals, multiple “states,” and multiple alternatives. Furthermore, we
have not considered the optimality of diﬀerent voting rules, an important but
apparently diﬃcult mechanism design issue. Finally, there is the possibility
of limited communication among jurors. As stressed by Coughlan (1997), a
single nonbinding “straw vote” is enough to allow jurors to share all their
4information in the binary signal model, thus eliminating the strategic aspects
of voting in a common preference environment. In general, a ﬁnite number
of “straw votes” is enough to allow jurors to share all their information if the
distribution of signals is discrete. But, when the opinions of jurors can reﬂect
subtle nuances of trials, a continuous distribution of signals seems better
suited to model the diﬃculties associated with limited communication.
2 Preliminaries
We consider n ≥ 2 jurors who must decide whether to convict or acquit a
defendant. The defendant is either innocent, I, or guilty, G, with probabili-
ties P(I) and P(G). Each juror i receives a real-valued signal si distributed
according to F(·|I) or F(·|G), depending on whether the defendant is inno-
cent or guilty. Conditional on the state, the signals of the jurors are drawn
independently. After receiving their signals, which are private information,
the jurors simultaneously vote to convict or acquit. Once the votes are tal-
lied, the defendant’s fate is determined by an anonymous, monotonic decision
rule, i.e., there is some integer, k, such that the defendant is convicted, C, if
k or more jurors vote to convict and acquitted, A, otherwise.
We assume the jurors have a common preference to convict the guilty and
acquit the innocent. We assume that these outcomes are equally desirable
and normalize the jurors’ payoﬀs in those cases to u(C|G) = u(A|I) = 0.
In the cases of convicting the innocent or acquitting the guilty, the jurors
receive negative payoﬀs u(C|I) and u(A|G). In eﬀect, the ex ante cost of






to denote the relative ex ante cost of acquittal.
A strategy for juror i is a measurable mapping σi: < → [0,1], where
σi(si) is the probability that the juror votes to convict after receiving signal




5where µI is the probability measure induced by F(·|I). The probability
that i votes to convict conditional on guilt is identical, except that µG, the
probability measure induced by F(·|G), is used. Probabilities of acquittal
are written similarly, but integrating 1 − σi rather than σi.
A proﬁle of strategies is denoted σ = (σ1,... ,σn). Given σ, the proba-






























The ex ante payoﬀ of a juror is
u(C|I)Pσ(C|I)P(I) + u(A|G)Pσ(A|G)P(G).
Let σ−i represent the strategies of jurors other than i. The probabilities that

































6Using the above deﬁnitions, we can obtain an expression for a juror’s
payoﬀ in terms of his probability of being pivotal. It translates to our frame-
work the insight from the literature on strategic voting that a voter should
condition his vote on being pivotal, as this is the only event where his vote
might aﬀect his payoﬀ.











The proof of this (and other auxiliary results) is found in the appendix.






A responsive equilibrium is an equilibrium σ such that each σi is responsive:
0 <
Z
σi(s)µG(ds) < 1 and 0 <
Z
σi(s)µI(ds) < 1.
There are always unresponsive equilibria: if k < n, it is an equilibrium for
the jurors to convict regardless of their signals; if k > 1, it is an equilibrium
acquit regardless of signal. A cutoﬀ equilibrium is a pure strategy equilibrium
σ such that each σi is a cutoﬀ strategy: there is some si ∈ [−∞,∞] such that
σi(s) =

1 if s > si
0 if s < si
for all s ∈ <. The cutoﬀ strategy associated with a given cutoﬀ is unique up
to the behavior of the juror upon receiving the cutoﬀ signal. Given assump-
tion (A1), below, this is a zero-probability event, and we will not distinguish
between cutoﬀ strategies that diﬀer only at the cutoﬀ.
In what follows we maintain several assumptions on F(·|I) and F(·|G)
that, as we will see, enable us to restrict our attention to cutoﬀ equilibria.
7(A1) The distribution functions are absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure and have piecewise continuous densities f(·|I) and
f(·|G).
This assumption implies that the distribution functions are diﬀerentiable at
all but a ﬁnite number of points. We will use Sd to denote the subset of
signals in S on which F(·|I) and F(·|G) are both diﬀerentiable.
(A2) The densities have common support, S = (S,S), where S,S ∈ [−∞,∞]:
in particular, f(s|I) > 0 and f(s|G) > 0 for all s ∈ S.
The latter implies that µI and µG have the same sets of measure zero. The
terms “µI-a.e.” and “µG-a.e.” are thus synonymous, so we can use “a.e.”
without ambiguity. Note that a cutoﬀ strategy given by si is responsive if
and only if si ∈ S.
(A3) The likelihood ratio, f(s|I)/f(s|G), is weakly decreasing on S.
This assumption is standard and amounts to assuming that higher signals
are stronger (or at least not weaker) indications of guilt. Sometimes we will
want a stronger condition to hold locally: we will say that the likelihood
ratio is locally strictly decreasing at x ∈ S if there is an open set containing








As we will see, a juror who behaves “naively” (i.e., as if his vote alone de-
termines the outcome) after receiving signal s would prefer to convict if
f(s|I)/f(s|G) > ρ and would prefer to acquit if f(s|I)/f(s|G) < ρ. Thus,
(A4) implies that there must be a signal low enough to induce a naive juror
to acquit, and a signal high enough to induce him to convict.
Lemma 0, stated in the appendix, establishes some implications of (A1)–
(A4). Among those that are well-known, F(·|G) exhibits (strict) ﬁrst order








Consider any proﬁle σ of responsive strategies and any juror i. Since the
strategies are responsive, Pσ−i(piv|G) and Pσ−i(piv|I) are positive. Hence,







is well-deﬁned on S. Moreover, for ﬁxed σ−i, it is weakly decreasing in its
second argument by (A3). Note that J(σ−i,s) > 0 if and only if
u(C|I)Pσ−i(piv|I)f(s|I)P(I) < u(A|G)Pσ−i(piv|G)f(s|G)P(G).
That is, J(σ−i,s) > 0 if and only if a juror’s expected payoﬀ from voting to
convict is less than the expected payoﬀ from voting to acquit, conditional
on receiving signal s and on the strategies of others. Hence, as shown in the
following lemma, jurors will be inclined to acquit when J is positive and to
convict when it is negative. In contrast, a naive juror would behave as if the
terms Pσ−i(piv|I) and Pσ−i(piv|G) were equal to one, voting to acquit if
u(C|I)f(s|I)P(I) < u(A|G)f(s|G)P(G)
and to convict if the inequality is reversed.
Lemma 1 Given responsive strategies σ−i for jurors other than i, a strategy
σi is a best response for i if and only if it satisﬁes the following a.e.:
σi(s) =

1 if J(σ−i,s) < 0
0 if J(σ−i,s) > 0.
If the likelihood ratio is locally strictly decreasing at inf{s ∈ S | J(σ−i,s) ≤
0}, σi is a best response for i if and only if it is equivalent a.e. to the
following cutoﬀ strategy ˜ σi:
˜ σi(s) =

1 if J(σ−i,s) ≤ 0
0 else.
2
9Since J is weakly decreasing in its second argument, an implication of the
ﬁrst part of the preceding lemma is that jurors always have best response
cutoﬀ strategies. Hence, if a proﬁle of strategies is an equilibrium when
jurors are restricted to cutoﬀ strategies, it will be an equilibrium of the
unrestricted game. From the second part of the lemma, if the likelihood
ratio is strictly decreasing, then all best responses for a juror are equivalent
to cutoﬀ strategies, regardless of the strategies of others, and all equilibria
are equivalent to cutoﬀ equilibria.
When all jurors other than i use the same cutoﬀ strategy, given by cutoﬀ











We will often focus on symmetric proﬁles of cutoﬀ strategies, in which case
we view J as a mapping deﬁned on S × S. We have already noted that J
is weakly decreasing in its second argument. The following lemma further
characterizes J for the case in which the jurors use the same cutoﬀ strategy.
Lemma 2 J is continuous and weakly decreasing in its ﬁrst argument. In
addition,
lims↓S J(s,s) > 0 and lims↑S J(s,s) < 0,
and thus s∗ = inf{s ∈ S | J(s,s) ≤ 0} ∈ S. Finally, J(s,s) = 0 has at most
one solution. 2
The following theorem establishes existence of a symmetric, responsive
cutoﬀ equilibrium and uniqueness within the class of symmetric, responsive
cutoﬀ proﬁles. If the likelihood ratio is strictly decreasing, there are no non-
cutoﬀ symmetric, responsive equilibria.
Theorem 1 There exists a symmetric, responsive cutoﬀ equilibrium with
cutoﬀ given by s∗ = inf{s ∈ S | J(s,s) ≤ 0}. It is unique within the class of
symmetric, responsive cutoﬀ proﬁles. If the likelihood ratio is locally strictly
decreasing at s∗, then this equilibrium is unique a.e. within the class of all
symmetric, responsive proﬁles. 2
10Proof By Lemma 1, s∗ deﬁnes a symmetric, responsive cutoﬀ equilibrium
if and only if s∗ ∈ S, J(s∗,s) ≥ 0 for all s < s∗, and J(s∗,s) ≤ 0 for
all s > s∗. The ﬁrst condition, that s∗ ∈ S, follows directly from Lemma
2. Take any s < s∗ and suppose J(s∗,s) < 0. Since J is continuous in
its ﬁrst argument, by Lemma 2, there is some  > 0 such that s∗ −  > s
and J(s∗ − ,s) < 0. Since J is weakly decreasing in its second argument,
J(s∗ − ,s∗ − ) < 0, contradicting our deﬁnition of s∗. Therefore, s < s∗
implies J(s∗,s) ≥ 0. Now take any s > s∗ and suppose J(s∗,s) > 0. Since J
is continuous in its ﬁrst argument, there is some  > 0 such that s∗ +  < s
and J(s∗ + ,s) > 0. Since J is weakly decreasing in its second argument,
J(s∗ + ,s∗ + ) > 0. Since J is also weakly decreasing in its ﬁrst argument,
by Lemma 2, J(ˆ s, ˆ s) > 0 for all ˆ s < s∗ +, contradicting the deﬁnition of s∗.
Therefore, s > s∗ implies J(s∗,s) ≤ 0, giving us the ﬁrst part of the theorem.
To prove the second part of the theorem, consider any s0 ∈ S such that
J(s0,s) ≥ 0 for all s < s0 and J(s0,s) ≤ 0 for all s > s0. If s0 < s∗, take  > 0
such that s∗− > s0. Then J(s0,s∗−) ≤ 0. Since J is weakly decreasing in its
ﬁrst argument, by Lemma 2, J(s∗−,s∗−) ≤ 0, contradicting our deﬁnition
of s∗. If s0 > s∗, take  > 0 such that s∗ +  < s0. Then J(s0,s∗ + ) ≥ 0.
Since J is weakly decreasing in its ﬁrst argument, J(s∗ + ,s∗ + ) ≥ 0.
Since J is weakly decreasing in its second argument as well, J(s,s) ≥ 0 for
all s < s∗ + . But J(s,s) = 0 has at most one solution, by Lemma 2, so
J(s,s) > 0 for all s < s∗ + , contradicting our deﬁnition of s∗.
To prove the third part of the theorem, assume that the likelihood ratio
is locally strictly decreasing at s∗. In any symmetric, responsive equilibrium,
the jurors use the same best response strategy. By Lemma 1, this strategy
is equivalent a.e. to a cutoﬀ strategy, and we just proved uniqueness within
the class of symmetric, responsive cutoﬀ proﬁles. ￿
A comparative statics result is immediate: since J(s,s) is weakly decreas-
ing in s, s∗ is weakly decreasing in ρ. Intuitively, if the relative probability
of guilt becomes higher, or if the relative cost of acquittal becomes higher, s∗
tends downward. Each juror’s probability of voting to convict tends upward
accordingly.
It is easily checked that, as long as S,S ∈ <, there is a symmetric strategy
proﬁle that maximizes the ex ante payoﬀ of the jurors among the class of
symmetric strategy proﬁles: we identify a symmetric strategy proﬁle σ =
11(ˆ σ,... , ˆ σ) with a point ˆ σ in the unit ball of L∞(S); endowing the unit ball
with the weak topology, the subset of strategies ˆ σ: < → [0,1] is compact,
and the jurors’ ex ante payoﬀ is continuous in ˆ σ; therefore, an optimum
exists. Moreover, by (A4), the optimal symmetric strategy proﬁle must be
responsive. Though McLennan (1998) considers a model with ﬁnite types,
the proof of his Theorem 2 uses only linearity of the jurors’ ex ante payoﬀ
and translates directly to our model, with the conclusion that every optimal
symmetric strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium. By Theorem 1, there is only one
such proﬁle if the likelihood ratio is strictly decreasing, and it is the unique
symmetric, responsive cutoﬀ equilibrium.
4 Examples
We give three examples to illustrate the general model developed above.
The ﬁrst is a continuous analogue of the binary signal model of Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1998), in which our pure strategy cutoﬀ equilibria can be
interpreted as puriﬁcations of the mixed strategy equilibria of their model.
More generally, any discrete signal model could be matched with a continuous
analogue in a similar way. In the second example, the signals of the jurors are
exponentially distributed, a particularly tractable functional form: the ratio
of hazard rates is constant (a convenient property in later sections), and the
probabilities of convicting an innocent and of acquitting a guilty defendant
are positive and independent of the number of jurors under unanimity rule,
anticipating our result on the asymptotic ineﬃciency of unanimity rule under
certain conditions. In the third example, the signals of the jurors have a chi-
square distribution. Here, the probabilities of convicting an innocent and
of acquitting a guilty defendant converge to zero as the jury size increases,
anticipating a result on the asymptotic probability of convicting an innocent.
4.1 The Binary Signal Model
To deﬁne the binary signal model in our framework, let S = (0,2),
f(s|I) =

p if 0 < s ≤ 1




1 − p if 0 < s ≤ 1
p if 1 < s < 2.
Obviously, the likelihood ratio is bounded over S. In order to satisfy (A3)
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s − 1 − ps + 2p
1 + ps − 2p
n−k
− ρ if 1 < s < 2.
Note that J is weakly decreasing (strictly so if 1 < k < n), and that it is
discontinuous at s = 1. See Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here.]
















we see that J(1,1) ≥ 0 if and only if (1) k < n
2 + 1 or (2) both k = n
2 + 1
and ρ ≤ 1. And lims↓1 J(s,s) ≤ 0 if and only if (3) k > n
2 or (4) both k = n
2
and ρ ≥ 1. We conclude that s∗ < 1 if neither (1) nor (2) hold; s∗ > 1 if
neither (3) nor (4) hold; in those cases, s∗ is given by the unique solution to
J(s,s) = 0. In the remaining cases, s∗ = 1.
In particular, we note that if a supermajority is required to convict, then
s∗ < 1 necessarily; if a majority is required and ρ ≥ 1, again s∗ < 1. That
13is, in equilibrium, jurors who receive some signals below one (indicating in-
nocence) will vote to acquit, while those who receive other signals above one
will vote to convict. Note also that s∗ = 1 holds if and only if either both
k = n
2 +1 and ρ < 1, or else both k = n
2 and ρ ≥ 1. Thus, it is an equilibrium
for jurors to “vote with their signals” only under majority rule (or close to
it) and then only for restricted ρ’s.
In the model of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), jurors get one of only
two possible signals: a signal that innocence is likely, which occurs with
probability p if the defendant is innocent and with probability 1 − p if the
defendant is guilty, and a signal that guilt is likely, which occurs with the
same probabilities reversed. Our example replaces the innocence signal with
a continuum of signals from 0 to 1, and the guilt signal with a continuum of
signals from 1 to 2. Whereas jurors who receive the innocence signal in their
model vote to acquit with some probability, say a < 1/2, and to convict with
some probability 1−a, we partition (0,1) into two intervals (0,a) and (a,1);
jurors who receive signals in (0,a) vote to acquit, and those who receive
signals in (a,1) vote to convict. Thus, the cutoﬀ equilibrium in our version
of the binary signal model is a puriﬁcation of the mixed strategy equilibrium
in their model.
Theorem 1 guarantees existence of a symmetric, responsive cutoﬀ equilib-
rium and uniqueness within that class; but because the likelihood ratio is not
anywhere locally strictly decreasing in the continuous version of the binary
signal model, the theorem does not guarantee uniqueness within the larger
class of all symmetric, responsive proﬁles. Indeed, because jurors who receive
signals between 0 and 1 are indiﬀerent between voting to convict and voting
to acquit, there is a continuum of symmetric, responsive non-cutoﬀ equilib-
ria: we could specify any subset of (0,1) with Lebesgue measure a and have
jurors receiving signals therein vote to acquit, jurors receiving other signals
vote to convict.





1−sp if 0 < s ≤ 1
1






1−s+sp if 0 < s ≤ 1
1
2−s if 1 < s < 2.
14Thus, the ratio of the hazard rate when innocent to the hazard rate when
guilty increases from p/(1 − p) at s = 0 to (p/(1 − p))2 at s = 1, and then
drops to one for 1 < s < 2.
4.2 The Exponential Model
To deﬁne the exponential model, let S = (0,∞), f(s|I) = λe−λs, and f(s|G) =
γe−γs. Again, the likelihood ratio is bounded. In order to satisfy (A3) and










which is strictly decreasing and continuous on S. See Figure 2.
[Figure 2 about here.]
The unique symmetric equilibrium is found by solving J(s∗,s∗) = 0; for











The hazard rates when innocent and guilty are simply λ and γ, respectively,
so the ratio of hazard rates is constant. (Other examples with constant ratios
of hazard rates can be easily obtained from certain parameterizations of the
Pareto and Weibull distributions.) Note that, under unanimity rule, the









and the probability of acquitting the defendant, conditional on guilt, is
1 − (1 − F(s
∗|G))






Both probabilities are strictly positive and independent of the size of the
jury. As a consequence, the probability of a mistake does not diminish as
the size of the jury increases.
154.3 The Chi-Square Model














where µ and ν are natural numbers and Γ(·) is the gamma function. In order
to satisfy (A3) and (A4), we need ν > µ. Note that the likelihood ratio is
unbounded and the ratio of hazard rates is strictly decreasing, two conditions
important in the following sections.













which is strictly decreasing and continuous on S. The unique symmetric
equilibrium is found by solving J(s∗,s∗) = 0; for the special case of unanimity











and the probability of acquitting the defendant, conditional on guilt, is
1 − (1 − F(s
∗|G))




Using these expressions, we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the chi-square model with µ = 2 and ν = 4, the prob-
abilities of convicting an innocent and acquitting a guilty defendant under
unanimity rule converge to zero as the jury size increases. 2
16Thus, we have a conclusion in stark contrast to that derived for the expo-
nential model, where the probabilities of mistakes are invariant with respect
to the size of the jury. As we will see in the next section, Proposition 2
also contrasts with the asymptotic properties of unanimity rule in the binary
signal model. The key is that the likelihood ratio is bounded in the binary
signal and exponential models, but not in the chi-square.
5 Unanimity Rule
In this section we investigate jury decision-making under unanimity rule. We
provide three results. First, we give conditions under which the symmetric,
responsive cutoﬀ equilibrium is unique among the class of all responsive pro-
ﬁles, dropping the qualiﬁcation of symmetry. Second, we identify conditions
under which unanimity rule exhibits a bias in favor of convicting innocent
defendants, regardless of the size of the jury. Third, we investigate the asymp-
totic properties of unanimity rule: if the likelihood ratio is bounded, so that
the likelihood of innocence cannot be arbitrarily great, then the probability
of a mistaken judgment is bounded strictly above zero; if the likelihood ratio
is unbounded, then the probability of convicting an innocent goes to zero
as n grows large. From the previous section, the former applies to the bi-









the hazard rates when the defendant is innocent and when guilty.
Theorem 2 If the ratio of hazard rates is strictly monotone and continu-
ous, then the symmetric, responsive cutoﬀ equilibrium under unanimity rule
is unique within the class of all responsive cutoﬀ proﬁles. If in addition
the likelihood ratio is strictly decreasing, then this equilibrium is unique a.e.
within the class of all responsive proﬁles. 2
Proof By Theorem 1, we know that there exists a unique symmetric, re-
sponsive cutoﬀ equilibrium. Let s1,... ,sn ∈ S be the cutoﬀs used by ju-
rors i = 1,... ,n in any responsive cutoﬀ equilibrium. We will show that














By Lemma 1, Ji(s1,... ,si−1,s,si+1,...sn) is greater than or equal to zero
for all s < si and less than or equal to zero for all s > si. Because the
ratio of hazard rates is continuous, the likelihood ratio is as well, and so
Ji(s1,... ,sn) is continuous. Thus, Ji(s1,... ,sn) = 0 for all i. This implies





















which, given strict monotonicity of the ratio of hazard rates, implies si = sj.
This establishes the uniqueness of the symmetric, responsive cutoﬀ equilib-
rium within the class of all responsive cutoﬀ proﬁles. If the likelihood ratio
is strictly decreasing, all responsive equilibria are cutoﬀ by Lemma 1, and
uniqueness a.e. within the class of all responsive proﬁles follows. ￿
Because the ratio of hazard rates is strictly decreasing and continuous in
the chi-square model, Theorem 2 establishes that there are no asymmetric,
responsive equilibria in that model. For the binary signal model, Theorem 2
suggests that asymmetric, responsive equilibria are possible under unanimity
rule because the ratio of hazard rates is discontinuous at s = 1; moreover, it is
constant for 1 < s < 2. For the exponential model, the theorem suggests that
asymmetric, responsive equilibria are possible, because the ratio of hazard
rates is constant for every s ∈ S. In fact, it is easy to show that there is
a continuum of asymmetric, responsive cutoﬀ equilibria in the exponential
model: any cutoﬀs s1,s2,... ,sn > 0 for the jurors satisfying
s









18corresponds to a responsive cutoﬀ equilibrium. (The symmetric equilibrium
identiﬁed in the previous section is obtained by setting all cutoﬀs equal.)
Note, however, that all these equilibria lead to the same probabilities of
convicting an innocent and acquitting a guilty defendant, and, hence, they
all lead to same expected payoﬀ for jurors.
We turn now to a comparison between unanimity rule and other voting
rules for an arbitrarily ﬁxed jury size: we give a suﬃcient condition for una-
nimity rule to exhibit a bias in favor of convicting innocent defendants. We
write sk for the cutoﬀ corresponding to the symmetric, responsive cutoﬀ equi-
librium when the number of votes needed to convict is k. Thus, the cutoﬀ
corresponding to unanimity rule is given by sn, and the cutoﬀ corresponding
to simple majority rule (with an odd number of voters) is given by s(n+1)/2.
We write Jk to make explicit the dependence of J on the decision rule. We
write Pk(C|I) for the probability of conviction conditional on innocence and
Pk(A|G) for the probability of acquittal conditional on guilt under the sym-
metric, responsive cutoﬀ equilibrium, when the number of votes needed to
convict is k.












































































































for k = 1,2,... ,n − 1.
Take any  > 0 such that sn− ∈ S and sk+ ∈ S. By deﬁnition of sn and
sk and because J is weakly decreasing in both arguments, Jn(sn−,sn−) >











for all s ∈ S, giving us

1 − F(sn − |I)
1 − F(sn − |G)




1 − F(sk + |I)





























and the assumption of the theorem delivers the desired inequality. ￿
20A direct implication of Theorem 3 is that, under the ratio of hazard
rates condition, unanimity rule does not dominate any other rule in terms
of mistake probabilities: Pn(C|I) < Pk(C|I) implies Pn(A|G) > Pk(A|G);
and Pn(A|G) < Pk(A|G) implies Pn(C|I) > Pk(C|I). The theorem has an







That is, the probability that the defendant is innocent, conditional on con-
viction, is higher under unanimity rule than when k votes are required to
convict.
To give a more transparent suﬃcient condition for the result of Theorem
3, we use the following lemma, which establishes that sk is weakly decreasing
in k. That is, as the number of votes required to convict the defendant
increases, jurors become more willing to vote for convicting.
Lemma 3 If n ≥ k0 > k ≥ 1, then sk0 ≤ sk. 2
We can now state a corollary of Theorem 3. The proof, given Theorem 3
and Lemma 3, is straightforward.








for all k = 1,2,... ,n − 1. 2
Applied to the binary signal model, because the ratio of hazard rates is
strictly increasing from 0 to 1, we know that the conclusion of the corollary
holds if sk < 1. In particular, it holds if k > n
2 + 1 or if both k = n
2 + 1
and ρ ≥ 1. (See Feddersen and Pesendorfer’s (1998) Table 1 for numerical
values when n = 12.) Applied to the exponential model, because the ratio of
hazard rates is constant, unanimity rule exhibits a bias toward convicting the
innocent compared to any other voting rule. Note, however, that the bias in
Theorem 3 is expressed in terms of the ratio of the probability of convicting an
21innocent to the probability of convicting a guilty defendant, and not simply in
terms of the probability of convicting an innocent. In the exponential model,
if n = 3,ρ = 1,λ = 1/2, and γ = 1/3, then the probability of convicting an
innocent under unanimity rule is (approximately) .2963 while under majority
rule it is .3061. In agreement with Theorem 3, the ratio of the probability of
convicting an innocent to the probability of convicting a guilty defendant is
2/3 under unanimity rule and .5889 under majority rule.
Theorem 3 cannot be applied to the chi-square model because the ratio
of hazard rates is decreasing. Indeed, if n = 3,ρ = 1,µ = 2, and ν = 4,
the probabilities of convicting an innocent and acquitting a guilty defendant
under unanimity rule are .2474 and .2212, while the same probabilities under
majority rule are .2674 and .2083. Hence, majority rule is biased towards
convicting an innocent with respect to unanimity rule in the sense of a higher
probability of convicting an innocent and in the sense of a higher ratio of that
probability to the probability of convicting a guilty defendant. Moreover, the
expected payoﬀ for jurors is higher under unanimity rule than under majority
rule.
Finally, we turn to the asymptotic properties of unanimity rule. To antic-
ipate the notation of the asymptotic results on other voting rules in the next
section, we write sn
1 for the cutoﬀ corresponding to the symmetric, respon-
sive cutoﬀ equilibrium under unanimity rule when the jury size is n. (The
subscript indicates the guilty vote, as a fraction of all jurors, needed to con-
vict.) Similarly, we write Jn
1 for the function J and P n
1 (C|I) and P n
1 (A|G) for
the probabilities of convicting an innocent and acquitting a guilty defendant.
The following lemma establishes that, under unanimity rule, the cutoﬀ cor-
responding to the symmetric, responsive cutoﬀ equilibrium converges to the
lower bound of the support of the signals as the number of jurors increases.
Thus, the probability that a given juror votes to acquit goes to zero.
Lemma 4 limn→∞ sn
1 = S. 2
An implication of Theorem 4, next, is that the probability of a mistaken
judgment under unanimity rule is bounded strictly above zero as the number
of jurors increases, if the likelihood ratio is bounded. Thus, we infer the
asymptotic ineﬃciency of unanimity rule in the binary signal and exponential
models. If the the likelihood ratio is unbounded, as in the chi-square model,
22we have seen in Proposition 2 that unanimity rule may be asymptotically
eﬃcient. In fact, we prove that the probability of convicting an innocent
defendant must then go to zero as the number of jurors increases.





1 − P n
1 (A|G)
< ∞.





1 − P n
1 (A|G)
= 0. 2
Proof By (A1), the likelihood ratio has at most a ﬁnite number of discon-
tinuity points, so by Lemma 4 there exists m such that, for all n > m, sn
1 is
a continuity point of Jn
1 . Hence, Jn
1 (sn
1,sn
1) = 0 for all such n. Thus,
P n
1 (C|I)
























where we use lims→S(1−F(s|I))/(1−F(s|G)) = 1. Since sn



















The ﬁrst limit above is clearly ﬁnite and positive. If the likelihood ratio
is unbounded above, then lims→S H(s|I)/H(s|G) = ∞. Since sn

















236 A Jury Theorem
In this section, we investigate the asymptotic properties of jury decision
rules other than unanimity as the jury size increases: the probability of a
mistaken judgment goes to zero for every non-unanimous voting rule. Rather
than specify the number of votes needed to convict, we will here deﬁne a rule
by the fraction, say α, of votes needed. Given n, the decision rule requiring
k votes to convict would be represented by α = k/n. For ease of exposition,
we only consider combinations of α and n such that αn is an integer. We
write sn
α for the cutoﬀ corresponding to the symmetric, responsive cutoﬀ
equilibrium when the α rule is used and the number of jurors is n. Similarly,
we write Jn
α for the function J and P n
α(C|I) and P n
α(A|G) for the probabilities
of convicting an innocent and acquitting a guilty defendant. We ﬁrst verify
that the ratio of hazard rates is eﬀectively bounded for all non-unanimous
rules.
Lemma 5 If 0 < α < 1 then








We now state and prove the main result of this section.















































for all s ∈ S. From Theorem 1, for each n there is a unique symmetric,
responsive cutoﬀ equilibrium characterized by the cutoﬀ sn
α = inf{s ∈ S |
Jn
α(s,s) ≤ 0}.
We claim that Lα(sn
α) → 1. If not, we can extract a subsequence with
limsup greater than one or liminf less than one. Without loss of generality,
we suppose this is true of {sn
α} itself. In the ﬁrst case, we can take m high
enough that [Lα(sm
α )]m > ρ. Using continuity of Lα, we can then take s > sm
α
close enough to sm
α that [Lα(s)]m > ρ. But then
J
m
α (s,s) ≥ [Lα(s)]
m − ρ > ρ − ρ = 0,
contradicting the deﬁnition of sm
α . In the second case, by Lemma 5






is ﬁnite. Take m high enough that [Lα(sm
α )]mH < ρ. Using continuity of Lα,
we can take s < sm
α close enough to sm
α so that [Lα(s)]mH < ρ. But then
J
m
α (s,s) ≤ [Lα(s)]
mH − ρ < ρ − ρ = 0,
contradicting the deﬁnition of sm
α .
We now claim that Lα(s) = 1 implies 1 − F(s|G) > α > 1 − F(s|I).
We use the facts that xα(1 − x)1−α is single-peaked at x = α and, by strict
ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, 1 − F(s|I) < 1 − F(s|G) for all s ∈ S. If
α ≤ 1−F(s|I) then α ≤ 1−F(s|I) < 1−F(s|G) and, by single-peakedness,
(1 − F(s|I))
α(F(s|I))
1−α > (1 − F(s|G))
α(F(s|G))
1−α,
or equivalently Lα(s) > 1, a contradiction. Similarly, if 1 − F(s|G) ≤ α,
then 1 − F(s|I) < 1 − F(s|G) ≤ α and, by single-peakedness, Lα(s) < 1, a
contradiction establishing the claim. Since Lα is decreasing, continuous, and












25(using L’Hˆ opital’s rule and (3) of Lemma 0), the set L−1
α (1) is a non-empty
closed interval, [s0,s00], with S < s0 ≤ s00 < S. By continuity of the distribu-
tion functions, we can take δ > 0 such that 1 − F(s|G) > α > 1 − F(s|I)
for all s ∈ [s0 − δ,s00 + δ]. Since Lα(sn
α) → 1, there exists l such that, for all
m > l, sm
α ∈ [s0 − δ,s00 + δ].
The last part of the proof is a straightforward application of the law
of large numbers. To prove P n
α(A|G) → 0, deﬁne the probability space
S∞ = S×S×··· with probability measure P, the product measure generated
by µG. Deﬁne the sequence X1,X2,... of i.i.d. random variables satisfying
Xi =

1 if si ≥ s00 + δ
0 else,




i=1 Xi converges almost surely to 1 − F(s00 + δ|G) as n
















#{i ≤ n | si ≥ s
n
α},





00 + δ|G) − Yn > ) → 0,
or equivalently,
P(Yn < 1 − F(s
00 + δ|G) − ) → 0
for all  > 0. Since 1−F(s00 +δ|G) > α, we can set  = 1−F(s00 +δ|G)−α,
yielding P(Yn < α) → 0. That is, the probability that the fraction of jurors
voting to convict a guilty defendant is smaller than α goes to zero as the
size of the jury goes to inﬁnity. Therefore, P n
α(A|G) → 0. The proof that
P n
α(C|I) → 0 is analogous. ￿
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27Inserting these expressions into u(C|I)Pσ(C|I)P(I) + u(A|G)Pσ(A|G)P(G)













































































1 − F(ˆ s|I)
1 − F(ˆ s|G)
>
1 − F(˜ s|I)
1 − F(˜ s|G)
(5)















for all ˜ s ∈ S and all ˆ s > ˜ s.
28Proof Results (1) and (2) follow from (A1)–(A3) and are well-known. Re-
sult (3) follows easily from (A3) and (A4). Result (4), stated with weak
inequality (that is, ﬁrst order stochastic dominance) is a well-known impli-
cation of (A3). Strict inequality follows from result (3) above. If (5) fails for
˜ s, then, by (2) above,
1 − F(˜ s|I)




for all s ∈ [ˆ s, ˜ s]



























for all x ≥ s0. Taking any s ∈ (ˆ s, ˜ s) and using (7),




























= 1 − F(s|I),
where the inequality follows from (A3) and our choice of s0. But this is a
contradiction, establishing (5). The proof of (6) is analogous. ￿
29Lemma 1 Given responsive strategies σ−i for jurors other than i, a strategy
σi is a best response for i if and only if it satisﬁes the following a.e.:
σi(s) =

1 if J(σ−i,s) < 0
0 if J(σ−i,s) > 0. (8)
If the likelihood ratio is locally strictly decreasing at inf{s ∈ S | J(σ−i,s) ≤
0}, σi is a best response for i if and only if it is equivalent a.e. to the
following cutoﬀ strategy ˜ σi:
˜ σi(s) =

1 if J(σ−i,s) ≤ 0
0 else.
2
Proof Suppose σi satisﬁes (8). Take any strategy σ0
i, and deﬁne the sets
V = {s ∈ S | J(σ−i,s) < 0 and σ
0
i(s) < 1}
W = {s ∈ S | J(σ−i,s) > 0 and σ
0
i(s) > 0}.
Note that σi(s) = 1 for all s ∈ V and σi(s) = 0 for all s ∈ W. Thus, using























By construction, s ∈ V implies J(σ−i,s) < 0, which implies that the in-
tegrand of the ﬁrst integral is positive; s ∈ W implies J(σ−i,s) > 0, which
implies that the integrand of the second integral is negative. Since σ0
i violates
(8) if and only if V ∪ W has positive measure, any strategy satisfying (8) is
a best response and any strategy violating (8) is not.
If the likelihood ratio is locally strictly decreasing at inf{s ∈ S | J(σ−i,s) ≤
0}, J(σ−i,s) = 0 has at most one solution, and hence (8) implies σi is equiv-
alent a.e. to ˜ σi, a cutoﬀ strategy. ￿
30Lemma 2 J is continuous and weakly decreasing in its ﬁrst argument. In
addition,
lims↓S J(s,s) > 0 and lims↑S J(s,s) < 0,
and thus s∗ = inf{s ∈ S | J(s,s) ≤ 0} ∈ S. Finally, J(s,s) = 0 has at most
one solution. 2
Proof Continuity of J in its ﬁrst argument is immediate, and weak mono-














































where we make use of L’Hˆ opital’s rule, (A4), and (3) of Lemma 0. This
proves the next part of the lemma. By (A1), J(s,s) has at most a ﬁnite
number of discontinuity points. Therefore, since lims↓S J(s,s) > 0, we can
ﬁnd s > S close enough to S so that J(s,s) > 0. Thus, s∗ > S. A similar
argument shows that s∗ < S. Thus, s∗ ∈ S.
For the last part, take any signal s such that J(s,s) = 0. We claim that,








31we are done. Thus, by (A3), we suppose the two likelihood ratios are equal.































by (5) of Lemma 0.
We look at three cases. If 1 < k < n, then by the deﬁnition of J and the
















then by (5) of Lemma 0 we are done. Otherwise, we have

































contradicting (A4). The case k = 1 is analogous. This establishes the claim
that s0 > s implies J(s0,s0) < 0. Therefore, J(s,s) = 0 has at most one
solution. ￿
Proposition 2 In the chi-square model with µ = 2 and ν = 4, the prob-
abilities of convicting an innocent and acquitting a guilty defendant under
unanimity rule converge to zero as the jury size increases. 2
Proof Let yn be the probability of convicting an innocent under unanimity
rule when the jury size is n. Using the equations given in the text for yn and
s∗ we obtain that yn must solve
n
n = (n − logyn)
n−1(−logyn)ρ.













Suppose some subsequence of yn converges to some number 1 ≥ κ > 0. Then,
because (1 + (t/n))n → et as n → ∞, the lefthand side converges to 1/κ.
Because −logyn/n → 0, the righthand side converges to ∞, a contradiction.
Hence, yn converges to zero.
33Now let xn be the probability of acquitting a guilty defendant under
unanimity rule when the jury size is n. Using the equations given in the text
for xn and yn we obtain







which converges to zero since, given a sequence {tn} that diverges to inﬁnity,
(1 + tn/n)ne−tn converges to 1 if tn/n converges to zero. (The proof of this
fact is a slight variation of a standard exercise in mathematical analysis.
In particular, to prove that liminfn→∞(1 + tn/n)ne−tn = 1, we can use the
binomial theorem to show that the diﬀerence between etn and the ﬁrst b3tnc−
1 terms in (1 + tn/n)n converges to a number smaller than 3t
b3tnc
n /2(b3tnc)!,
which converges to zero by an application of Stirling’s formula.) ￿




1 − F(s | I)




n−k f(s | I)
f(s | G)
− ρ.
By (2) of Lemma 0, given arbitrary s ∈ S,
1 − F(s | I)





which implies Jk0(s,s) ≤ Jk(s,s) for k0 > k. This implies
{s ∈ S | Jk(s,s) ≤ 0} ⊆ {s ∈ S | Jk0(s,s) ≤ 0},
from which we conclude sk0 ≤ sk. ￿
Lemma 4 sn
1 → S 2
Proof If not, we can extract a subsequence that converges to a limit larger
than S. Without loss of generality, suppose this is true of {sn
1} itself, so that
sn








= γ < 1
34by (4) of Lemma 0, or by (3) of Lemma 0 if ˜ s = S. By continuity, we can
pick ˆ s ∈ (S, ˜ s) such that
1 − F(ˆ s|I)















which is less than zero for high enough n. Because sn
1 → ˜ s > ˆ s, we can pick
n high enough that Jn
1 (ˆ s, ˆ s) < 0 and sn
1 > ˆ s, a contradiction. ￿
Lemma 5 If 0 < α < 1, then








Proof Suppose H = ∞, and take any subsequence along which the ratio
of hazard rates diverges to inﬁnity. Without loss of generality, suppose this
is true of {sn
α} itself. Note that the likelihood ratio along this sequence also
diverges to inﬁnity. We ﬁrst claim that sn
α 6→ S. If the sequence does converge
to S, note that Jn
α(sn
α,sn
α) = 0 for high enough n, since the likelihood ratio
has at most a ﬁnite number of discontinuity points by (A1). Now take any
0 < b < 1, arbitrarily large c, and d satisfying d > α+c
1−α. Then there exists m

































































where the last inequality follows from d > α+c




α) > 0 for high enough n, a contradiction.
The remaining possibility is sn
α 6→ S. Then there exists a subsequence






Since the ratio of hazard rates goes to inﬁnity along the subsequence, the
subsequence must converge to S. But, applying L’Hˆ opital’s rule, the ratio of
hazard rates then converges to one along the subsequence, a contradiction.
Therefore, α < 1 implies H is ﬁnite. ￿
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